Condition-based and predictive maintenance enable early detection of critical system conditions and thereby enable decision makers to forestall faults and mitigate them. However, decision makers also need to take the operational and production needs into consideration for optimal decision-making when scheduling maintenance activities. Particularly in network systems, such as power grids, decisions on the maintenance of single assets can affect the entire network and are, therefore, more complex.
Introduction
Traditionally, maintenance of power systems has been scheduled in a preventive way, which can be typically done with long planning horizons. The maintenance intervals are typically balancing between the availability of the system, the impact of the failure and the maintenance costs. Condition-based and predictive maintenance enable to perform maintenance only when it is required based on the condition of the system and the predicted evolution of the degradation [1, 6, 25] . However, this decreases the planning horizons significantly since the prediction horizons of the algorithms typically require shorter reaction times for decisions. This requires a more complex maintenance scheduling since more coordination between the different decision makers is required because at the network level the decision of one decision maker may affect the entire network.
In general, the maintenance scheduling goal is to maximize the system's reliability. One major challenge associated with maintenance scheduling in the network system, like a power grids, is that the decision-makers need to consider the system's constraints. The main constraint of the power grid in the electrical market is the energy fulfillment. Making a trade-off between maximizing the reliability and balancing the load demand plays a significant role in the maintenance scheduling of generating units. Several research studies have addressed the trade-off between maximizing reliability and load balancing using an optimization approach, agent-based modelling and incentive signals solutions [20, 16] .
The optimization approach for the maintenance schedule of power generating units in a electrical market system has been implemented in different ways. A method for optimal maintenance scheduling based on genetic algorithm has been proposed in [22, 19, 2] . A meta-heuristic approach for the optimal maintenance scheduling of generation units using reliability-based objective function is presented in [5] . Furthermore, a method for joint optimization of generation scheduling and preventive maintenance has been elaborated in [24, 18, 21] . The goal of the proposed optimization model in [24] is to minimize the total cost including production cost, preventive maintenance cost, minimal repair cost for unexpected failures and tardiness cost. The authors of [18] propose a multi-objective optimization model to maximize the profits of selling electricity and maintaining a system reserve. A proposed approach in [21] considers the generating reserves, the loss of load expectation (LOLE), and the operational costs as objectives in a single framework. The generation scheduling from the viewpoint of the central system is formulated in [10, 7] , which can be solved using nonlinear mixed integer programming method. These research studies achieve an optimal solution of the maintenance optimization in a centralized manner. In other words, the generating units do not decide on their maintenance independently. Their maintenance schedule is solely determined by the central system. This centralized approach may result in high computational costs.
In addition to solving a central optimization problem, there are several research studies which propose to formulate the maintenance scheduling problem in a decentralized way where agents decide on their maintenance scheduling. In [17] , an agent-based approach is proposed to maximize a system's reliability while considering the load balance as a constraint. The bi-level optimization approach is developed in [14] , where agents maximize their rewards in the upper level and the central system clears the market in the lower level. The authors of [13] propose a decentralized robust optimization approach which leads to an increase of system performance and reliability. A stochastic maintenance scheduling is proposed in [9] , where agents choose their maintenance decisions and TSO makes a final decisions by considering the system's reliability and constraints. All of these research studies do not consider any negotiation or coordination mechanism between central system and agents.
Further to the centralized optimization and agent-based modelling, several research studies have also addressed the generation maintenance scheduling using incentives or penalty signals. The authors of [4] propose an incentive signal which ensures an appropriate level of reliability. In this paper, the central system obtains the maintenance scheduling using an optimization approach to maximize the reliability and minimize a cost function. Moreover, each agent seeks to maximize its objective function that conflicts with the goal of the central system. This challenge is solved using a coordination mechanism based on an incentive signal. The maintenance scheduling of generating units based on game theory is proposed in [15] . The authors consider the competition among agents using game theory and develop a coordination mechanism using an incentive signal to align the objective function of agents with that of the central system. In a further study, a novel mechanism that balances between the benefits of the agents and the system reliability is proposed in [8] . In this paper, the agents submit a set of maintenance bidding costs to the central system by considering the unexpected event of unit failures. The central system schedules the maintenance which satisfies the system's energy demand. Then, the central system sets the final expenditure to make a coordination mechanism. A further coordination mechanism to maintain the central system reliability while maximizing the benefits of agents is proposed in [23] . One of the limitations of the previously proposed mechanisms is that all of the mechanisms are not budget balanced.
In this paper, we propose a novel bi-level negotiation algorithm in the context of condition-based and predictive maintenance between the central coordinating system and decentralized power generating agents using incentive signals. We first develop a new model for the agents' objective functions which is based on the deterioration cost and the revenue that agents can obtain from the energy production. Our proposed model is specifically targeting the context of condition-based and predictive maintenance which enables agents to decide to perform maintenance before the failure occurs. Hence, the reliability of the system is preserved and the corrective maintenance costs are avoided. However, the agents have only a limited time window to take their decision. In addition, to ensure load fulfillment, we propose a new negotiation algorithm where agents submit their optimal maintenance time slot to the central system. Agents' decisions are rejected by the central system if the load fulfillment cannot be satisfied during the time period of the maintenance. We develop a maintenance optimization model for the central system which strikes a balance between the proximity of the time to failure estimate of the individual agents and the need to fulfill the load balance at the systemic level. If the agents' decisions can not be accepted, the central system sends an incentive signal to encourage the agents to adjust the proposition of the maintenance time slot before failure. The procedure iterates until the convergence occurs, i.e. the adjusted decisions of all agents can be accepted by the central system. Our proposed mechanism provides a weak budget balance during negotiation and a full budget balance at the convergence point. In other words, during the negotiation of the algorithm, the agents pay the money to the central system so the revenue of the central system is positive, and at the convergence point, the agents do not pay or receive the money and the revenue of the central system is zero. Indicating that the mechanism of incentive signals by the central system does not add overheads to the market mechanism. Remarkably, this is one of the the main features of the mechanism design problem in the literature [12] . Furthermore, our simulation results show that the rewards of the agents are positive during the convergence process of the proposed algorithm. Hence, we can conclude that the proposed induced mechanism is individually rational for each of the agents. This means, assuming rational agents, they will participate voluntarily in the mechanism.
The main differences to the previously applied approaches are two-fold: Firstly, in the proposed approach, the agents decide about their maintenance decisions in a decentralized way, while in most of the previously proposed approaches such as in [22, 19, 2, 5, 24, 18, 21, 10, 7] the optimization problem is solved in a centralized way. Secondly, we ensure the reliability and load fulfillment by proposing a negotiation algorithm between the agents and the central system. This is contrary to the previously proposed approaches, such as in [17, 14, 13, 9] .
In addition, the proposed framework comprises two main contributions which distinguish it from the approaches proposing induced incentives :
• Firstly, we propose a framework that is suitable in the context of condition-based and predictive maintenance while previous studies mostly considered preventive and corrective maintenance setup. • Secondly and most importantly, the proposed induced mechanism is weak budget balanced and individually rational, contrary to the previously proposed approaches [4, 15, 8, 23] .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the framework of the negotiation algorithm in Section 2. The problem formulation which consists of the agents' and central system's objective function is introduced in 3. Section 4 represents the coordination procedure among agents and central system using an incentive signal. The case study is introduced in Section 5. The simulation results are shown in Section 6. The concluding remarks are made in Section 7.
Framework of the proposed negotiation mechanism
The proposed two-level multi-agent system for the maintenance decision support aims to minimize the generation cost while maximizing the system reliability in terms of generation adequacy. The framework integrates a central coordination system, the transmission system operator (TSO) and distributed agents representing power generation units that act to maximize their profit and decide about the optimal maintenance time slots while ensuring the fulfilment of the power demand.
The proposed mechanism consists of three main steps to make sure that the system is reliable and the power demand is fulfilled. The schematic of the proposed mechanism is shown in Figure 1 . (1) Each agent decides on the maintenance time slot for a fixed period of time (x n , n in n = {1, · · · , N }), depending on the rewards that it obtains by generating the power and the cost of maintenance, respectively the potential failure. Then, they submit their decisions (bids) to the central system. (2) The central coordinating system is responsible for the reliability at the network level and load fulfillment. Hence, in the case that the load cannot be fully supplied if all the decisions of the agents are accepted, the central system selectively accepts the bids of the agents that are close to the failure time and rejects other bids which is expressed as (y) in Figure 1 . (3) Since the agents will fail if no maintenance is performed within the specified time period and incur into failure costs, the central coordinating system encourages them to change their decisions by providing an incentive signal (I n ) to them.
Problem formulation

Deterioration cost
Generation units are equipped with condition monitoring devices, which can detect the fault initiation. We assume that the failure behaviour of the components is not dominated by continuous gradual degradation but rather by faults that can be detected by the condition monitoring system. After the detection, the remaining useful lifetime is predicted. The maintenance action should be then performed within the time window t 1,n , defining the fault initiation of agent n, and and t 2,n , defining the end of life of the agent which in this case is equivalent to the failure time of the generation unit. To model the increasing deterioration and the increasing failure probability of the component after the detection of the fault, we introduce a degradation penalty. While the degradation itself may not be linear, we model the penalty costs between the fault detection and the end of life as a ramp function. t 1,n is, therefore, the starting time to impose a deterioration penalty on agent n, if it does not decide for a maintenance at this time. Since the failure time is known to be t 2,n , agent n will be unable to produce power from this time on.
Agents' objective function
The generators determine the maintenance time slots based on maximizing their reward functions. The agents are price-takers, in the sense that they generate revenue by providing the capacity to fulfill the power demand. Each agent's objective function comprises two parts. The first part is the sum of the rewards of its generated power over the time horizon, which is computed by subtracting the sum of the generation costs from the revenue. The second part is the deterioration cost.
Let us consider T as the maintenance scheduling time consisting of K n horizon time for each of the agent n in n = {1, · · · , N }. Each horizon is the period of time that agents fail if they do not perform maintenance.
For each of the agent n in n = {1, · · · , N }, the decision-making process can be formulated as the following integer linear programming optimization problem
, · · · , T }, k = {1, · · · , K n },
where
is the reward that agent n gets from the power generation at time t in horizon k and
is the penalty that agent n gets between t 1,n (k) and t 2,n (k) in horizon k. This penalty function based on the value of α n encourages agent n to perform maintenance before the failure time.
The constraint C 1 denotes that the maintenance decision is a binary variable. Where, x n (t) = 1 means that agent n decides to perform maintenance at time t. Constraint C 2 expresses the period of time that an agent needs for the maintenance known as the repair time. Constraint C 3 makes sure that agent n performs maintenance between t 1,n (k) and t 2,n (k) in horizon k, where t2,n(k) t=t1,n(k)
x n (t) = 1 means that agent n decides to perform maintenance before the failure time t 2,n (k).
Central system's objective function
The central system coordinator, i.e. TSO, maximizes the system's reliability while fully supplying the power demand. The central system has only a coordinating function. It cannot change the agents' decisions but only provide incentives to motivate them to change their decision. This formulation corresponds to the setup in real applications where agent are independent stakeholders.
To this end, we propose a model where the central system prioritizes the decisions of the agents that are close to t 2,n (k), n = {1, · · · , N }, k = {1, · · · , K n }, while ensuring the fulfillment of the energy demand. Hence, we model the central system's objective as the following integer linear programming optimization problem:
where y = [y 1 , · · · , y N ], and y n = [y n (1), · · · , y n (T )], n = {1, · · · , N }. Constraint A 1 denotes that the central system's decision is a binary variable. Constraint A 2 denotes that the central system just accepts and rejects the agents' decisions and does not force them to perform maintenance. Constraint A 3 ensures that power demand is satisfied given the maintenance decisions.
Coordination procedure using an incentive signal
We seek to find time slots for the maintenance action between t 1,n (k − 1) and t 2,n (k), n = {1, · · · , N }, k = {1, · · · , K n }, such that the TSO accepts the maintenance decision proposed by the agent n within this time frame. When this is the case the overall system load is fully supplied and at the same time the agents can perform maintenance actions on the generating units. To achieve this aim, we propose a negotiation process between the agents and the central system by using an incentive signal.
In the negotiation process at each iteration i, agents set their decisions based on Equation (1), and submit them to the central system. Then, the central system solves Equation (2) for making a decision about whether to accept or reject the agents' maintenance decisions. If y n (t) = 1 and x n (t) = 1, agent n can perform maintenance, otherwise the decision of agent n has been rejected and y n (t) = 0. In the case that agents' decisions cannot be accepted because the load can not be satisfied, the central system sends an incentive signal to the agents so that they are motivated to change their maintenance decisions. Without imposing an incentive signal, the agents whose decisions have not been accepted by the central system can not perform maintenance before failure and they fail. Hence, they can not produce power which is also not in the interest of the central system. Therefore, we need an incentive signal such that all the agents decisions Can be accepted by the central system. This negotiation continues until all the agents' decision will be accepted by the central system. We define an incentive signal for agent n at iteration i and time t as:
where x i n (t) is the decision of agent n at iteration i and time t. y j n (t) is the central system decision at iteration j. The rationale of the incentive signal is detailed in Section 4.1
Hence, during the negotiation process at iteration i the objective function and the optimization problem for agent n becomes:
where x i n = [x i n (1), · · · , x i n (T )]. The negotiation algorithm for the maintenance decision is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Negotiation algorithm for maintenance decision 1: Input: x 0 n (t) = 0, y 0 n (t) = 0, n = {1, · · · , N }, t = {1, · · · , T }. Iterate: 2: For n = 1, · · · , N repeat until convergence: 3: Obtain x i n (t) using Equation (4), t = {1, · · · , T }. 4: Obtain y i n (t) using Equation (2), t = {1, · · · , T }. 5: If y i n (t) = x i n (t), t = {1, · · · , T }, calculate incentive signal using Equation (3). 6: i ← i + 1.
Rationale of the proposed incentive signal
If the maintenance decision of agent n cannot be accepted by the central system at iteration i, the agent will get −γ n x i n (t) as a penalty function in every iteration after i. Since the agent seeks to maximize its objective function, it will likely change its maintenance decision and does not decide at time t for maintenance. Additionally, if the central system accepts the agent's decisions at iteration i, the agent will not change its decision in the next iteration.
The developed coordination framework embraces the following assumptions: Assumption 1. We assume that the repair time (r n (k), n = {1, · · · , N }, k = {1, · · · , K n }) is sufficiently small with respect to (t 2,n (k) − t 1,n (k), n = {1, · · · , N }, k = {1, · · · , K n }). As in the worst case where t 1,n (k) and t 2,n (k) are equal for all the agents we have:
Assumption 2. We assume that at each time one agent can perform maintenance while the power demand is satisfied. In other words, if agent j in n = {1, · · · , N } decides to perform maintenance at time t ∈ {1, · · · , T }, we have N n=1,n =j q max n ≥ L(t).
Notice that the above two assumptions are not too conservatism in the real system. Since agents are heterogeneous, the worst-case of t 1,n (k) and t 2,n (k) are equal for all agents does not happen frequently. Moreover, in fact, the failure rate is not high, so it is reasonable assumption that the repair time is small relative to (t 2,n (k) − t 1,n (k)). Furthermore, in most of the real electricity market there exists enough capacity, hence when just one agent performs maintenance the load can be satisfied.
The following lemma imposes a condition that guarantees that, when the agents' decisions can not be accepted by the central system, the agents will change their decisions at the next iteration. Lemma 1. Consider x i n (t) and y i n (t) as the maintenance decision of agent n and the central system at time t and iteration i of the algorithm. In the case that x i n (t) is not equivalent to y i n (t), x i+1 n (t) will not equal to x i n (t) if we have:
sign (t − t 1,n (k)) − sign(t − t 2,n (k)) , n = {1, · · · , N }, k = {1, · · · , K n }.
Proof. If x i n (t) does not equal to y i n (t), it means that x i n (t) equals to one, hence the agent n gets −γ n as the penalty function. We can conclude that agent n will not choose x i+1 n (t) = 1 if it gets a lower reward than x i+1 n (t) = 0 which would not be rational. Hence, we have:
−γ n ≤ 1 2 1 − sign(t − t 2,n (k)) P (t)q n (t) − C n (t) −α n (t − t 1,n (k)) sign (t − t 1,n (k)) − sign(t − t 2,n (k)) .
(6) We ensure that Equation (6) holds if we have
since γ should be positive, so (5) must be satisfied.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 converges, in the sense that lim i→∞ y i n (t) = x i n (t), t = {1, · · · , T }, n = {1, · · · , N }.
Proof. Lemma (1) implies that at each iteration of the algorithm agents whose decisions can not be accepted by the central system will change their decisions at the next iteration. In addition, Assumptions (1) and (2) ensure that there is sufficient time between t 1,n (k) and t 2,n (k), in each horizon, such that all the agents' decisions can be accepted by the central system.
Weak budget balance
The proposed incentive signal is budget balanced if the amount of money that the central system has to pay or receive from the negotiating agents would be equal to zero [11] . This condition is expressed by:
In the proposed algorithm, when the agents' decisions can not be accepted by the central system at each iteration, then these agents get the penalty (I i n (t) ≤ 0) or reward (I i n (t) ≥ 0). If the amount of money that agents have to pay to the central system (I i n (t) ≤ 0) would be equal to the amount of that other agents get from the central system (I i n (t) ≥ 0), then the induced mechanism is termed budget balance. Moreover, if the sum of the incentive signal given to the agents by the central system is less than zero then the induced mechanism is a weak budget balance. In other words, the revenue of the central system is positive:
In the real system, it means that at each iteration of the algorithm, the agents whose decisions can not be accepted by the central system have to pay an amount to the central system as the penalty function and they can reduce the amount of penalty by changing their maintenance scheduling.
Since in each iteration of the proposed incentive algorithm, y i n (t) ≤ x i n (t), we can deduce that I i n (t) ≤ 0. Hence, our mechanism has a weak budget balance.
Case study
The developed algorithm is applied to the IEEE 39 bus New England system [3] . The system consists of 39 buses, 46 branches of which 12 transformers, and 10 generating units with the total generating capacity of 7367 MW. The yearly load curve with peak demand of 6254 MW and minimum demand of 2187 MW is used for the simulations (Figure 2) . The transmission grid is neglected in this study, i.e. the line power flow limits are not taken into account. We further neglect the start-up and shut-down ramp rate constraints and the minimum up and down time constraint of all generating units. In addition, all the agents consider that the price of the electricity market does not change during the negotiation process and it equals to the market clearing price [3] when all the agents are available and can generate the power based on their capacities.
Results
The results of the maintenance algorithm are shown for a period of 365 days. The values of the thresholds t 1 and t 2 for different time horizons for all the agents are displayed in Table 1 . The values have been generated randomly to demonstrate the suitability of the proposed approach. Remark 1. The selected values of t 1 and t 2 shown in Table 1 exemplify relatively large failure rates for each agent. This selection allows demonstrating the negotiation process in the simulation results for the size of the test system. Nonetheless, the proposed coordination algorithm can account for planning horizons of several years.
The convergence of the decision making process of the agents and central system at each iteration of the algorithm are shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 shows that the decisions of agents 3 and 7 are not acceptable for the central system in the first iteration of the algorithm. In this case, the two generators would fail if they do not perform maintenance before t 2 (k) in each decision horizon. Therefore, we introduce an incentive signal which encourages the agents to change their decisions. Indeed, in the next iteration, agents 3 and 7 change their decisions, such that the central system accepts their decisions. However, the decision of agent 1 can not be accepted in this iteration. The negotiation is, therefore, repeated until the convergence can be reached. Finally, all the agent's decisions are accepted by the central system in the last iteration as shown in Figure 3 (c) . Therefore, we can conclude that the algorithm converges and after this time the agents' decisions will not change. Figure 4 shows the maximum available capacity during the negotiation process. Figure 4 . Full-filled capacity during the negotiation process (a) at the first iteration (b) at the second iteration (c) at the third iteration. Figure 4 shows that during the first and second iterations of the algorithm the available capacity that agents can fulfill is less than the load of the system, hence the central system cannot accept the maintenance decisions of all the agents. At the third iteration the available capacity made by the agents' decisions is higher than the power demand, therefore all the agents' decisions are accepted.
We compare the incentives or penalties of agents whose decisions could not be accepted in at least one iteration (agents 1, 3 and 7) in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that agents 3 and 7 get the penalty function, since their maintenance decisions can not be accepted. Then, in the second iteration of the algorithm they modify their decisions and do not need to pay to the central system and their decisions can be accepted. However, in this iteration agent 1 gets a penalty function since its decision is rejected by the central system. At iteration 3, the algorithm converges and agents get no penalty. Hence, based on Table 2 , the revenue of the central system during the negotiation is positive, so the mechanism is weak budget balance. In addition, at the convergence point of the algorithm the mechanism is budget balance.
We compare the change of achieved rewards for agents 1, 3 and 7 during the negotiation process in Table  3 .
As we can see in Table 3 , the rewards of all these agents are positive, even when they get a negative incentive signal. We can infer from these positive rewards that the agents will participate in the negotiation algorithm voluntarily, assuming that agents are rational, since they get positive rewards rather than zero rewards by not participating in the negotiation. Hence, our proposed incentive signal has the individual rationality feature.
Comparison of the proposed algorithm to the baseline decisions
The results of the proposed algorithm are compared against to the baseline solutions, where agents decide in each horizon for t 1 , which corresponds to the condition-based maintenance, since no remaining useful lifetime prediction can be provided; or respectively for t 2 , which corresponds to corrective maintenance.
The decisions of agents at t 1 and t 2 are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 , respectively. Central system maintenance decision Agent maintenance decision at t 2 Figure 6 . Maintenance decisions at t 2 (please note that the decisions of agents 4 and 7 would not fulfill the load)
We compare the rewards of the agents for the three analysed cases: decisions at t 1 , t 2 and based on the negotiation algorithm ( Figure 7 ). Figure 7 . Comparison of the rewards in the three cases: Negotiation algorithm, condition based decision t 1 , decision at t 2 Figure 7 shows that the agents' rewards for the negotiation algorithm are larger than or equal to the rewards in the other two cases when their decisions are accepted by the central system. This is also an expected outcome since the agents' decisions in the negotiation algorithm are based on the optimization approach which maximizes their rewards (Equation (1)). However, in the cases when the agents decisions cannot be accepted by the central system and they receive an incentive signal, their decisions do not maximize the reward functions (Equation (1)). Therefore, the reward could be smaller than the rewards that they would obtain by the decision at t 2 or t 1 . Agents 4 and 7 are the agents who get the incentive signal and their rewards are smaller than the potential rewards for the decisions at t 2 and t 1 , respectively. However, Figure 6 shows that maintenance decisions of agents' 4 and 7 cannot be accepted by the central system. In this case, they would fail would not get any rewards. One of the other peculiarities is that agent 1 gets a negative reward when it decides for maintenance at t 2 because the generation cost of this agent is high so it can not generate more power when it is not under maintenance. Hence, the reward that it can get by its generation is small and the maintenance cost is higher than this reward, resulting in a negative accumulated reward. We compare the energy cost if agents in Table 4 . Table 4 demonstrates that due to high production costs, agent 1 can only produce high power when the energy demand and the market price are high. Therefore, the total reward of agent 1 is low. In comparison, the generation cost of agents 9 and 10 are low and resulting in high rewards for these two agents. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel negotiation algorithm to solve the generation maintenance scheduling problem in the context of condition-based and predictive maintenance. Furthermore, we propose a model for the agents' objective function, which allows the maintenance actions to be executed before the failures occur. One of the main contributions of the paper is the proposed incentive mechanism for power generators which makes sure that the agents' maintenance activities do not prevent power to be fully supplied to the demand.
Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism results in better performance in comparison to the base-line decisions such as the purely condition-based maintenance or the corrective maintenance. Moreover, our mechanism has the feature of a weak budget balance and is individually rational for each of the agents.
As future research, the uncertainty could be included in the objective function of the agents and stochastic programming approach could be applied to solve the problem. This could also enable a more realistic degradation model that can be integrated in the penalty function. Furthermore, the transmission grid, i.e. the line power flow limits can be considered. Moreover, some assumptions on the generation units, such as assuming that generating units do not have any ramp-up or down in their operation could be relaxed in future research.
It would be also interesting to test the proposed algorithm in more extensive networks with more agents and more coordination requirements.
